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Federal–State Relations 
in Labor Exchange Policy
David E. Balducchi and Alison J. Pasternak
In 1933 the United States Employment Service was created—a co-
operative State and Federal enterprise. . . . The Federal–State co-
operation has been splendid.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
September 6, 1936
This chapter will describe noteworthy policy issues over the past
decade that affected federal–state relations in the delivery of labor ex-
change services funded under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933. We will
explain how the intergovernmental structure of the public employment
service (ES) established under the Wagner-Peyser Act faced serious
challenges during the 1990s and ultimately was strengthened. This was
an era aptly described by Nathan and Gais (2000) as Second Order De-
volution—a type of federalism that extols the merits of local authority
and privatization of government services. While we will focus primari-
ly on labor exchange policy of the 1990s, we also will summarize labor
exchange policies from President Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s to
President Reagan’s New Federalism of the 1980s, and speculate on
President George W. Bush’s labor exchange policy.
The division of power between state and local control of workforce
development programs is a pivotal issue of workforce federalism. Since
the 1970s, a constant tension in workforce federalism has existed be-
tween state-administered labor exchange programs under the Wagner-
Peyser Act and local-administered job training programs under the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act (JTPA), and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).
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The division of power between the Wagner-Peyser Act and job training
laws during three eras of New Federalism is the subject of this chapter.
Our policy lens will be focused primarily on federal policy making,
leading up to and following the enactment of WIA in 1998.
We aim to demystify some of the seeming contradictions of work-
force federalism during the era of New Democrat President Clinton that
paradoxically strengthened state control of labor exchange policy while
consolidating control of local workforce development services under
the one-stop delivery system. We will examine the relationships be-
tween the federal government and state and local authorities during a
decade marked by notable changes in national labor exchange policy. 
LABOR EXCHANGE POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE
APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
More than 30 years ago, Richard H. Leach (1970, p. 57) wrote that
federalism was designed as a negative device to inhibit the use of pow-
er in the United States. The examination of federal–state relations in the
administration of a public ES requires study of federalism’s competing
ideologies during the last century: centralized government to meet the
economic crisis of the Great Depression; and its counterassault, decen-
tralized government dubbed New Federalism, which shifted power to
state and local authorities in order to reduce big government and deficit
spending.
The Federal–State Relationship
Under the U.S. Constitution, responsibility between the central
(i.e., federal) government and subgovernments (i.e., states) is divided.
A federal system limits the centralization of power by defining spheres
of authority. The Tenth Amendment specifies that those “powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple.” The term local government does not appear in the Constitution.
Throughout the Republic’s history, the division of authority between
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the federal government and the states has been contentious. Resulting
from that tension has been a remarkable elasticity in the relationship
between the levels of government. This relationship has sustained the
people’s general welfare and the capitalist market as authority has shift-
ed back and forth to meet political and economic circumstances.
Cooperative Federalism and Labor Exchange Policy
By the early 20th century, nearly half the states and a small number
of local governments created public employment offices to address In-
dustrial Age dislocations resulting from economic downturns. In the
1930s, the mounting surge of unemployment incited a public demand
for a national labor exchange policy. After an attempt to create a na-
tional ES system failed in 1931, two years later President Roosevelt
signed into law the Wagner-Peyser Act.1
Under the Rooseveltian New Deal, federal programs to aid states
were implemented under a cooperative partnership. According to Vines
(1976, p. 13), cooperative federalism refers to cooperative procedures
to accomplish national policies established by the federal government;
state and local governments receive federal funds called grants-in-aid2
to administer public programs. During this period, direct federal inter-
vention in state labor exchange policy helped shore up the U.S. econo-
my through referral of unemployed workers by public employment of-
fices to public works projects and establishment of a national ES
system.
Under section 1 of the Wagner-Peyser Act, the U.S. Department of
Labor (USDOL) was charged with 1) establishing a national system of
public employment offices through a “confederation of permanent
State employment services operating in cooperation with the Federal
Government . . .” (Persons 1934), and 2) revitalizing the U.S. Employ-
ment Service (USES) by vesting responsibility for administration of the
federal–state ES system under its aegis. In essence, the Wagner-Peyser
Act set up a federal-directed, state-run system of public employment
offices.
The Wagner-Peyser Act was enacted as a federal–state grants-in-
aid3 program. States created ES agencies through legislation in order to
receive federal grants for administration of local ES offices. Except
during World War II, when state ES agencies were federalized to recruit
labor for industrial defense production, the ES has remained a feder-
al–state cooperative program. Preceding enactment of the Wagner-
Peyser Act and for the next three decades, policy debates on gover-
nance centered on whether the ES should be nationalized or whether
the federal–state structure should be maintained (Haber and Kruger
1964, p. 67). The federal–state arrangement was chosen over an entire-
ly federal scheme for several rea-
sons, among them was that state
control allowed greater flexibility
and efficiency in the management
of local ES offices (Persons 1934,
p. 4).4
Coordination of the UI and 
ES programs
The Social Security Act of
1935 required the payment of
unemployment benefits through
public employment offices or oth-
er offices approved by the Social
Security Board. The Social Secu-
rity Board designated only state
ES offices for the payment of ben-
efits. With the passage in 1938 of
UI laws in all states, the states
charged their ES offices with ad-
ministering the so-called work test whereby to qualify for benefits, UI
claimants must be able to work, be available for suitable work, and
must register for work (in most states).
According to some observers, this new responsibility brought a
mixed windfall. While it increased the number and diversity of workers
on file, over time it dulled the image of state ES offices through their re-
lationship with UI and identification as “unemployment offices”—
places that did not attract workers seeking first or better jobs. Despite
this, and due in part to postwar prosperity, from 1946 to 1962, when the
Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) was enacted, state
ES agencies were viewed as employer oriented, as they were the sole
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State ES agencies administer public labor
exchange services without fee to job
seekers or employers.  Services for job
seekers include assessment, together with
interviewing, counseling, and testing; job
search workshops; and job placement.
Services for employers include job order
taking, recruitment, screening, and refer-
ral of job seekers.  Other services include
matching job seekers and employers, ad-
ministering work test requirements of
state unemployment insurance (UI) laws,
and producing and disseminating labor
market information.  Services under the
Wagner-Peyser Act do not include skill
training (section 7 of the Wagner-Peyser
Act).  Under Title I of WIA, adults and
dislocated workers receive, without eligi-
bility requirements, labor exchange ser-
vices as core services from public and
private service providers.
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public employment agency designed to meet employers’ production re-
quirements. The federal role in state labor exchange policy was mostly
passive, and no attempt was made to manipulate the labor market
(Johnson 1973, pp. 13–15).
Creative Federalism and Labor Exchange Policy
By the late 1950s, America began to address the problems of pover-
ty, race, and class. Early job training programs were contained in the
Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 and the MDTA of 1962. State ES
agencies were assigned responsibility to designate areas of high unem-
ployment, analyze the local labor market to determine suitable occupa-
tions for training, and select and refer job seekers to training (Guttman
1990). In 1964, President Johnson declared an “unconditional war on
poverty” and signed the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) into law. To
this end, the federal government instituted job training programs, called
“manpower programs,” in local areas to aid disadvantaged workers.
Johnson referred to this period as Creative Federalism (Wright
1997, p. 583), in which grants established direct intergovernmental re-
lations at substate levels, often bypassing state or local governments.
According to Guttman (1990), an alternative workforce development
structure was created under EOA, in part because of concern that state
ES agencies might not be responsive to disadvantaged workers.5 Local-
ities administered most manpower programs through grants-in-aid, and
the job matching role of state ES agencies was deemphasized (Balduc-
chi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 408). The ES was tradition-bound and
slow in instituting active labor exchange policies to assist disadvan-
taged workers (Sundquist 1968, p. 68). State ES agencies played a sub-
ordinate role in the delivery of services to the disadvantaged.
New Federalism
During the 1970s, President Nixon reduced federal grants-in-aid
and replaced them with block grants to state and local governments,
with the intention of decentralizing welfare and workforce develop-
ment programs that provided services to localities. This approach be-
came known as New Federalism—a domestic policy framework that
exalts state and local control over federal control. The evolution of New
Federalism as it applies to labor exchange policy is examined during
three eras:
1) Permissive New Federalism (Vines 1976). Nixon’s decentral-
ized approach to workforce policies reduced grant-in-aid pro-
grams, instituted block grants, and established a federal–local
training delivery structure under CETA. 
2) Devolution New Federalism. Reagan’s devolutionary approach
to workforce policies revamped the federal–local training
structure and labeled it JTPA, expanded state control of ES ac-
tivities, joined state ES and local job training planning and
budgeting cycles, and nearly abdicated federal oversight of
state ES agencies.
3) Second Order Devolution New Federalism. Clinton’s third-
way approach to workforce policies gave preference to local
control of workforce policies, sought to incorporate market-
based principles into state one-stop delivery systems under
WIA, and, after considerable political agitation, strengthened
state control of labor exchange policy.
Permissive New Federalism and Labor Exchange Policy
The seeds of Permissive New Federalism in workforce develop-
ment reform were sown when state ES agencies lost authority to feder-
al–local community action agencies established under EOA (Guttman
1990). In 1973, Nixon approved a job training bill called CETA. This
act provided job training funds through block grants to local govern-
ments, called prime sponsors. Prime sponsors were responsible for ad-
ministering the delivery of job training through public and private
agencies. According to Guttman (1990), it was recognized that services
such as testing, counseling, job referral, and job development under
CETA duplicated state ES services, so CETA contained provisions al-
lowing for subcontracting to state ES agencies and requiring coordina-
tion. Decisions about how to accomplish subcontracting and coordina-
tion were left to local areas with varied results. 
In 1978, as part of the renewal of CETA, President Carter support-
ed the Nixon decentralized, local control approach to job training. Un-
der Carter, prime sponsors were encouraged to establish private indus-
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try councils that included business representatives to oversee job train-
ing priorities and promote employment. During this period, the feder-
al–state structure of the Wagner-Peyser Act remained intact, and the
role of state ES agencies was not at the forefront of workforce policy.
Carter’s workforce development policy embraced Nixon’s New Feder-
alism, ratifying a bipartisan preference for permissive, decentralized
federalism.
Devolution New Federalism and Labor Exchange Policy
The goal of Reagan’s Devolution New Federalism6 was to devolve
the federal role in the design, finance, and operation of social programs.
Reagan was ideologically opposed not only to centralization of the
New Deal and Great Society programs, but also to the decentralization
of the Permissive New Federalism programs. Dissatisfaction with re-
peated allegations of fraud and abuse in CETA public service employ-
ment and training programs led to enactment in 1982 of JTPA, a
trimmed-back version of CETA job training. Under JTPA, state gover-
nors “were promoted from merely overseeing the rural ‘balance of
state’ [activities] to a dominant position in governing the program”
(Mangum 2000, p. 296). Local prime sponsors were reorganized as ser-
vice delivery areas and job training continued to be delivered by public
and private agencies (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001).
Incorporation of state ES agencies into job training reform under
JTPA was spurred by the politics of limited government. The Reagan
Administration and the 97th Congress agreed that to achieve authentic
coordination between state ES agencies and local job training agencies,
the New Deal era Wagner-Peyser Act required an overhaul. To conform
to Devolution New Federalism, Title V of JTPA included makeover
amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act. While the cooperative structure
was retained, the amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act shifted addi-
tional authority to states in three ways: 1) they allowed governors ex-
tensive discretion in the use of Wagner-Peyser Act funds to administer
state ES agencies; 2) they provided for joint planning between state ES
agencies and local job training agencies, and the review of both plans
by state JTPA councils (which included employers); and 3) they creat-
ed for the first time a needs-based state allocation formula based on la-
bor force size and unemployment rate. To the extent possible, federal
involvement in the planning and administration of job training and ES
programs was eliminated.
There is no legislative history explaining what Congress intended
when it expanded state authority in the administration of ES programs
(Guttman 1990). Perhaps the devolution of authority to states derived
from the deregulatory climate of the Reagan era. Ardent USDOL polit-
ical aides, whose policies reflected Reagan’s view of limited govern-
ment, developed the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations issued in Novem-
ber 1983, and in 1987 supported a bolder legislative attempt by the
Reagan Administration to devolve ES as part of the Trade, Employment
and Productivity Act. The bill7 called for further reduction of federal in-
volvement in the ES system and decentralizing to states ES planning,
financing, and administering authority. The 100th Congress did not
take action on the legislation. For the remainder of the decade and into
the early 1990s, Congress and USDOL had little interest in revisiting
the federal–state ES partnership or the role of ES agencies in labor ex-
change policy. 
Second Order Devolution New Federalism and Labor 
Exchange Policy8
Between 1994 and 1998, Congress considered three major work-
force development reform bills, each of which included the establish-
ment of a one-stop delivery system to consolidate delivery of workforce
development services. The first two bills failed to pass.
The first unsuccessful bill was the Reemployment Act of 1994. This
bill reflected the themes of Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gae-
bler 1992), which heavily influenced the early Clinton presidency. The
book’s thesis is that many public programs could be improved if they
competed in the marketplace. The idea of introducing competition into
Wagner-Peyser Act service delivery—a concept presented through a se-
ries of public consultation papers developed by Clinton policymakers in
late 1993 and early 1994—met resistance, with some states and labor
unions arguing that the proposal was defective. Among the proposal’s
defects, three were often mentioned: 1) private agencies were likely to
help only those customers who were easiest and most profitable to serve;
2) employer UI taxes were levied to support state ES agencies, not pri-
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vate agencies; and 3) competition created duplication of services. Oppo-
sition to competition in the delivery of ES services convinced Clinton to
modify the competitive model advocated by Osborne and the New Dem-
ocrats. The modified bill, unveiled in March 1994, ensured that the state
ES agency would be a preemptive deliverer of labor exchange services.
However, Clinton was unable to marshal broad support for the Reem-
ployment Act, due largely to a preoccupation with complex health care
reform. The 103rd Congress ended without decisive action on the bill,
and in December 1994 Clinton issued a renewed workforce policy pro-
posal called the G.I. Bill for America’s Workers.
In the 104th Congress, legislators passed two versions of workforce
development reform: the House version, called the Consolidated and
Reformed Education, Employment, and Rehabilitation Systems Act
(CAREERS Act), and the Senate version, called the Workforce Devel-
opment Act. Both bills reflected features of Clinton’s policy proposal;
however, the bills contained major differences in the division of federal
authority between the Secretaries of Labor and Education. The Senate
bill also amended section 1 of the Wagner-Peyser Act by deleting the
word “public” before “employment offices,” which could have resulted
in privatizing Wagner-Peyser Act service delivery.9 In May 1996, to aid
House and Senate deliberations, Clinton defined his views on work-
force federalism. In a letter to Congress, he endorsed local control of
job training programs, yet he declared that governors should remain re-
sponsible for federal grants-in-aid to administer a public ES and should
have approval authority over job training plans. Clinton’s letter went on
to assert that local one-stop centers should be administered by local
boards, and job training funds should be allocated to local communities
for adults, dislocated workers, and youth (Clinton 1996). The confer-
ence bill died when the Senate would not relinquish its view that state
governors should be given greater control (Fine 1996).
Finally, a revised bill, WIA (H.R. 1385), was introduced in the
105th Congress on April 17, 1997, and enacted August 7, 1998 (P.L.
105-220), culminating a five-year struggle to achieve workforce devel-
opment reform. The paramount feature of WIA is that workforce devel-
opment programs, including ES, must be delivered through local one-
stop centers. However, WIA did not change the supervision for the bulk
of one-stop services; supervision continues to be divided between state
and local governments. Under Title I of WIA, states distribute to local
boards federal job training funds for adults, dislocated workers and
youth, and local boards decide how these funds are to be spent. In con-
trast, state agencies retain responsibility for the administration of feder-
al grants-in-aid for ES and UI programs, and state merit-staff employ-
ees deliver ES and UI services.10
ONE-STOP DELIVERY SYSTEM AND WORKER PROFILING
AND REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES
In the early 1990s, states began to consolidate the delivery of work-
force development programs. The National Performance Review’s
(NPR) policy recommendation in 1993 challenged the United States to
“(c)reate a system of competitive, one-stop, career development cen-
ters open to all Americans” (NPR 1993, p. 49), and in October 1994
USDOL launched the one-stop implementation grant initiative. In the
same month, a federal–state work group issued an ES revitalization
work plan advocating that state ES agencies be a gateway for workers
in the new one-stop system.11 Still, governors were allowed to select
the lead agency for the one-stop effort, and between 1994 and 2000,
each state received a one-stop implementation grant distributed over a
three-year period. The amount of the grant was based on need, and it in-
cluded no provision to cover ongoing costs. In most states, governors
selected their unified workforce development agencies to administer
the grants, with state JTPA policymakers often directing the projects.
In 1993, Congress amended the Social Security Act by requiring
states to establish a Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
(WPRS) system to identify UI claimants who are likely to exhaust ben-
efits and will need job search assistance and refer them to reemploy-
ment services so as to expedite their return to work. By 1996, all states
had implemented a WPRS system, with state ES agencies providing the
bulk of reemployment services to claimants.12 Meanwhile, USDOL’s
welfare-to-work grants, which supported job-finding and placement
services for welfare recipients, were directed to JTPA agencies.13 Yet,
state ES job search workshops grew as a result of the WPRS system,
and this growth had a distinct policy consequence: the WPRS system
bolstered the case of some USDOL program managers, who in 1997
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began advocating for an increase in annual Wagner-Peyser Act funds
for reemployment services.14 During fiscal years (FYs) 2001–2003,
USDOL’s annual appropriation included an additional $35 million in
Wagner-Peyser Act funds to provide reemployment services, enabling
more UI claimants to be served than would otherwise be possible.
ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE WAGNER-PEYSER ACT AND
THE PRIVATIZATION CHALLENGE
In configuring workforce development reform in the 1990s, Demo-
crat and Republican political leaders supported decentralized, local
control of state one-stop systems, but they were less certain how to con-
solidate the administration of ES and job training services. Under WIA,
the coexistence of the state ES system and local job training programs
has continued, but only after some state and local policymakers sought
to decentralize the authority of ES and to contest the delivery of Wag-
ner-Peyser Act services, thereby setting in opposition cooperative fed-
eralism and second order devolution. The framework of the original
Wagner-Peyser Act was the battleground.
Original Intent and Federalism
The original Wagner-Peyser Act framework as implemented by
USDOL consisted of five requirements for a state to become affiliated
with the national ES system: 1) establish a state ES agency to cooperate
with USES; 2) develop a plan of service; 3) institute a merit personnel
system; 4) appropriate matching funds;15 and 5) appoint an advisory
council.16 The Secretary of Labor was allowed discretion in developing
requirements for the receipt of grants. The first three requirements were
still in effect during the Clinton era, and debate about the fate 
of the Wagner-Peyser Act centered on the following three rootstock
requirements.
1) Establish a state ES agency. “State legislatures must accept the
provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act and designate or authorize the cre-
ation of a state agency to administer” the provisions of the Act (Persons
1934, p. 5). Congress envisioned a strong role for the state agency in
operating labor exchange policy. In fact, the Committee on Education
and Labor report that accompanied the Wagner-Peyser Act (S. 510)
stated:
We are of the opinion that it is essential that there be a centralized
employment service in each State and that it is highly important
that there be a coordinated service between the States. This bill
proposes a scheme of Federal leadership, with the placement work
done by the States, in cooperation with such leadership. (U.S.
Congress 1933, p. 4)
2) Develop a plan of service. “[A] plan for the operation of the
state ES must be submitted by the state agency and approved by USES”
(Persons 1934, p. 5). In 1937, a cooperative agreement between the
Secretary of Labor and the Social Security Board provided that USES
and the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation act as a single agency
in all matters affecting state operations, including development of joint
plans of service (U.S. Congress 1964, p. 270). Until the Wagner-Peyser
Act amendments of 1982, ES plans were developed with UI plans.
Since then, state ES plans have been developed in conjunction with job
training agencies. To some degree, this has resulted in a lack of atten-
tion to statewide labor exchange policies.
3) Institute a merit personnel system. “[In] the plan of service,
the state ES must have agreed to conform to the standards of USES re-
lating to personnel, premises, procedure, and to submit reports on ex-
penditures and operations as required” (Persons 1934, p. 5). Shortly af-
ter the Wagner-Peyser Act was enacted, USES adopted a requirement
that states must administer a merit personnel system in which appoint-
ments and promotions are based upon competence. This requirement
ensures that hiring is not affected by patronage, that the execution of
program services is impartial and nonpartisan, and that the delivery of
services is not affected by favoritism (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001, p.
159). According to Persons (1934), the requirement was a subject of
much discussion; yet to ensure the highest quality of state ES opera-
tions, USDOL concluded that state staff must be of superb quality and
politically impartial. It seemed to USDOL that a merit personnel sys-
tem—in which individuals are rated objectively on their experience, ed-
ucation, understanding of the job, and personality—was the most reli-
able means to ensure the highest quality of ES operations.
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In sum, the USDOL requirements for the Wagner-Peyser Act man-
date that a state agency administer the Wagner-Peyser Act, submit a
plan of service to USDOL for approval, utilize a merit personnel sys-
tem, and deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services using state agency em-
ployees. In due course, the market-based urges of New Democrats and
Republicans seeking workforce reform were tested against the potency
of these long-standing Wagner-Peyser Act requirements. Moreover, the
end-of-century march toward workforce development reform raised a
high order issue of federalism: whether the federal government has the
power to set and enforce requirements upon states in dispensing grants-
in-aid to administer programs of a national realm, namely the ES. The
federal–state disputes that advanced this issue are described below.
Privatization, State Control, and Labor Exchange Policy
Whether states may delegate the administrative functions of state
ES agencies to local boards and allow Wagner-Peyser Act services to be
delivered by employees of public or private agencies rather than of the
state ES agency (Lazerus et al. 1998, p. 17) became a policy controver-
sy that could have resulted in workforce reform deadlock. The states of
Massachusetts, Texas, Colorado, and Michigan introduced alternatives
to state ES agency delivery of labor exchange services before USDOL
had fully settled on a Wagner-Peyser Act policy of its own making.17
Massachusetts. In October 1994, Massachusetts received a federal
one-stop implementation grant. The grant authorized local boards to
contest the delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act labor exchange and job train-
ing services, and allowed both public and private agencies to deliver
such services. The grant reflected views of USDOL policy officials who
sought market competition as a method to raise the quality of services.
In April 1998, during the Michigan compliance dispute (see below),
USDOL revisited the Massachusetts model and instructed the state to
restrict competitive delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act services to four lo-
cal areas (Boston, Springfield, Cambridge, and Brockton) where it re-
mains.18
Texas. In January 1996, Texas sought to replicate the Massachu-
setts model through state legislation. In June, USDOL advised Texas
that it should not proceed until a federal policy review was completed.
Further, it warned Texas not to decentralize control of Wagner-Peyser
Act funds to local boards or contest the delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act
services. At that juncture, USDOL began to weigh the legal and policy
merits of privatization as it applied to the Wagner-Peyser Act.
Colorado. In 1997, Colorado was granted permission to devolve
the delivery of state ES services to county governments under the au-
thority of its one-stop implementation grant and Wagner-Peyser Act
plan of service. In August 1999, Colorado was instructed to ensure that
county employees who deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services were pro-
tected by a merit personnel system consistent with federal merit staff
requirements. 
Michigan.19 Michigan began reorganizing its workforce develop-
ment structure in August 1997. The confusion caused by an inconsis-
tent federal policy allowing alternative ES delivery structures in Mas-
sachusetts and Colorado, contributed to a pitched brawl for
intergovernmental control between USDOL and Michigan on whether
Wagner-Peyser Act services may be privatized20 (see Appendix 2A). In
February 1998, Governor John Engler reorganized Michigan’s ES
agency by delegating responsibility for the delivery of public ES ser-
vices to local boards, which were required to administer labor exchange
services through competitive contracts with public or private agencies.
Further, job seekers and employers were directed to use computerized
self-services for most Wagner-Peyser Act services.
Michigan proceeded unilaterally to implement its reorganization21
despite notice from USDOL that it should not move forward without
approval of a modified Wagner-Peyser Act plan of service or it would
risk sanctions. Michigan argued that the Wagner-Peyser Act did not re-
quire a merit personnel system. In February, Secretary of Labor Alexis
Herman imposed sanctions on Michigan by placing a hold on its letter
of bank credit to draw Wagner-Peyser Act funds and putting it on a
cost-reimbursement payment system; USDOL also revoked Michigan’s
one-stop implementation grant. Despite the sanctions, USDOL enabled
services to job seekers and employers in Michigan to continue, but a
congressional inquiry was held on March 25 to examine USDOL’s ac-
tions.
The reorganization raised four marquee federal concerns. First,
Michigan’s reorganization permitted ES services to be delivered by
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public or private agencies. USDOL requires that merit-staff employees
of a state agency (working in local offices) deliver ES services. Second,
the reorganization restricted staff-assisted counseling, job search assis-
tance, and job referrals to veterans, disabled job seekers, and migrant
and seasonal farmworkers. Job seekers and employers would be able to
access self-services through Michigan’s computer job bank, which was
linked to America’s Job Bank (AJB). USDOL contended that such an
unbalanced service strategy would undercut the national purpose of the
Wagner-Peyser Act: to provide a full-range of Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices that include self-services and staff-assisted services. Third, under
Michigan’s proposed “self-services only” approach, it was not clear
how ES could identify a job opportunity for a specific UI claimant, re-
fer that UI claimant to a job, and determine the result of the referral.
The Wagner-Peyser Act requires state ES agencies to participate in the
administration of the UI work test, which often necessitates staff-assist-
ed services. Fourth, the reorganization was executed notwithstanding
repeated notice from USDOL that an approved modification of the
Wagner-Peyser Act plan of service was needed.
In response to federal sanctions, Michigan sued USDOL, and on
May 15, 1998, the U.S. District Court issued an opinion in State of
Michigan v. Alexis M. Herman (W. D. MI, Southern Div.) granting
USDOL’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that
USDOL’s long-standing construction of section 3(a) of the Wagner-
Peyser Act (and the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970) to re-
quire merit staffing22 is a reasonable and permissible interpretation of
the Act. Michigan filed an appeal and set in motion other intricate polit-
ical measures to support its case.23
On July 31, Herman and Engler announced agreement on a frame-
work for the administration of Michigan’s labor exchange program.24
USDOL consented to the delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act services by
public agencies other than a state agency, provided that such agencies
utilize a merit personnel system and that the provisions of the agree-
ment apply only to Michigan. Michigan agreed to consult with public
employee unions in implementing the agreement. As a final point,
Michigan agreed to withdraw its appeal of the lawsuit and not to press
for other legal, legislative or policy solutions (USDOL 1998). By Octo-
ber, USDOL approved Michigan’s modified Wagner-Peyser Act plan of
service, which incorporated the provisions of the agreement, and lifted
sanctions.
Florida. The first consequential post-WIA test of the Wagner-
Peyser Act interim regulations occurred in 1999 with legislative actions
in Florida. The Florida legislature took up several complicated legisla-
tive bills that decentralized responsibility for Wagner-Peyser Act funds
to local boards, allowed for competition in the delivery of labor ex-
change services, and split state responsibility for ES and UI programs
between two cabinet departments. During the state legislative process,
USDOL raised serious objections to privatization of labor exchange
services and, for the first time in the Clinton era, objected to legislative
attempts to bifurcate state agency responsibility for UI and ES pro-
grams.25 In 2000, Florida enacted the Workforce Innovation Act, creat-
ing a single, new state agency (the Agency for Workforce Innovation)
to administer WIA, UI, and ES programs without privatizing labor ex-
change services. 
Summary
Prior to WIA, USDOL exercised its administrative authority under
section 3(a) of the Wagner-Peyser Act to allow alternative service deliv-
ery approaches in three states: Colorado, Massachusetts, and Michi-
gan.26 USDOL is sponsoring a third-party evaluation of the three alter-
native delivery approaches. In each situation, USDOL is examining
different methods of Wagner-Peyser Act service delivery. In Colorado,
Wagner-Peyser Act services are delivered through county governments
using state and county employees. In Massachusetts, state ES employ-
ees deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services except in four local areas where
services are delivered by for-profit and nonprofit private and public
agencies. In Michigan, Wagner-Peyser Act services are delivered by
public employees limited to employees of state government, local units
of government, special purpose units of government, school districts,
intermediate school districts, public community colleges, and public
colleges and universities. Efforts to privatize Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices in Texas and Florida were averted, and in Florida the locus and
exercise of authority of the state ES agency were affirmed and the orga-
nizational proximity of UI and ES was sustained. 
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FEDERAL POLICY MAKING: WAGNER-PEYSER ACT
AMENDMENTS AND REGULATORY REVISIONS
Separate authorization and distinct funding for Wagner-Peyser Act
services were retained under WIA. Yet, Title III of WIA requires Wag-
ner-Peyser Act labor exchange services to be part of state one-stop de-
livery systems; UI claimants to receive Wagner-Peyser Act reemploy-
ment services; and state Wagner-Peyser Act plans to be integrated with
state WIA plans. In concert with the development of WIA regulations,
revisions to Wagner-Peyser Act regulations27 began earnestly in fall
1998. Interim regulations were issued in April 1999, and final regula-
tions were issued in August 2000.
Throughout the regulatory process, debate ensued over several mat-
ters affecting the intergovernmental balance of the federal–state ES
structure. These matters focused on the degree of supremacy of the state
agency in administering Wagner-Peyser Act funds and the delivery of
statewide services in the new, local one-stop delivery systems made up
of for-profit, nonprofit, and public service providers. The contenders in-
cluded New Democrats and Republicans eager to privatize government
services, and a dominant faction of federal policymakers attracted ideo-
logically to the federal–local job training structure established under
CETA and JTPA. Others were state Wagner-Peyser Act agencies and lo-
cal boards who vied for authority of Wagner-Peyser Act funds. Still oth-
ers were labor unions that wielded the clout of the ballot box to uphold
the supremacy of the state agency and protect their constituencies.
USDOL made an early tactical decision to make minimal changes to
the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations at 20 CFR 652, Subpart A, Employ-
ment Service Operations, and to place the rules that govern Wagner-
Peyser Act amendments contained in WIA in a new regulatory Subpart
C, Wagner-Peyser Act Services in a One-Stop Delivery System Environ-
ment. Policymakers, including an author of this chapter, reasoned that
Subpart A contained the long-standing requirements of the Wagner-
Peyser Act and to incorporate the new rules into it might place the vital
features of the ES program under regulatory scrutiny, especially from
those seeking to privatize the delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act services.
The tactic proved successful.
Six key federal–state subject areas illustrate new labor exchange
policies that arose from amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act and oth-
er federal actions. These labor exchange policies are examined, includ-
ing descriptions of the contentious issues and the federal policies ren-
dered. 
1) Role of the state Wagner-Peyser Act agency and merit-
staffing requirements. During the development of the Wagner-Peyser
Act regulations, the issues of whether only public employees would de-
liver Wagner-Peyser Act services and whether the employees would be
protected under a merit personnel system were not high-order con-
cerns. As policy matters, these issues were resolved in the Michigan
agreement, and USDOL crafted federal interim regulations to ensure
uniform application nationwide. 
Similar policy clarity was not easily attained with what became the
supreme issue of the regulatory process: which levels of subgovern-
ment (i.e., state, county, or city) were eligible to deliver Wagner-Peyser
Act services. During 1999 and 2000, the policy choice within USDOL
regarding eligible Wagner-Peyser Act service providers whipsawed
back and forth between state agencies or all public agencies. In the
Michigan agreement, Secretary Herman allowed merit-staff employees
of public agencies to delivery Wagner-Peyser Act services, but held that
the demonstration only applied to Michigan. However, interim regula-
tions authorized subgovernments to deliver Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices. Prominent labor unions assailed the policy. They viewed the de-
livery of Wagner-Peyser Act services by subgovernment employees as
severely weakening state agency authority. Labor unions charged that
allowing merit-staff employees of public agencies to dispense Wagner-
Peyser Act services would undermine the supremacy of the state ES
agency, and disrupt the statewide delivery of uniform, impartial labor
exchange services.28
Interim regulations on the merit-staff issue were crafted by
USDOL to serve several policy objectives. USDOL sought to meet the
perceived needs of local one-stop delivery systems by allowing multi-
ple public service providers to deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services
while preserving the merit personnel requirement. Labor unions pre-
cisely identified USDOL’s policy intention. They and others charged
that the result of this policy would be the unraveling of the single, ag-
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gregated state ES agency. To address stakeholders’ concerns, USDOL
officials met with various groups, including public employee unions
that sought meetings to convey their views on behalf of their members.
After heated debate, USDOL policymakers resolved that the secretary’s
declaration in the Michigan agreement that her decision applied exclu-
sively to Michigan meant just that. USDOL declared that employees of
a state agency must deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services. 
Federal policy. The final Wagner-Peyser Act regulations affirmed
that state ES agencies have exclusive authority to deliver Wagner-
Peyser Act services through state employees. The policy consequence
was nothing less than preservation of a single state agency under the
governor’s control to administer statewide labor exchange policy. 
2) Local ES offices in the one-stop delivery system. At the time
WIA was enacted in 1998, the national structure of federal–state ES
offices reached nearly 2,400 and each state operated a network of com-
puter job banks linked to AJB. To incorporate the delivery of Wagner-
Peyser Act services into local one-stop delivery systems, as required
by the amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act, interim federal regula-
tions stipulated that the state ES agency must make Wagner-Peyser 
Act services available in at least one comprehensive one-stop center 
in each local area, and that it may operate other ES offices in each lo-
cal area as affiliated sites or through electronically connected access
points.
This regulation raised inquiries about the nature of affiliated ES of-
fices. In one instance, some of North Carolina’s local ES offices were
not designated as one-stop centers. The North Carolina ES agency
questioned whether it was required to provide a full range of labor ex-
change services on a full-time basis in all one-stop centers, in addition
to its existing, affiliated local ES offices. The interim federal regula-
tions had not contemplated the state ES agency providing only partial
services or part-time staffing at comprehensive one-stop centers. Dur-
ing the approval process of North Carolina’s five-year WIA and Wag-
ner-Peyser Act plan, USDOL determined that for the one-stop delivery
system to be viable in each state, a full range of Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices must be provided on a full-time basis in a one-stop center in each
local area. 
Federal policy. The intent of federal policy was to require com-
plete consolidation of Wagner-Peyser Act services into the one-stop de-
livery system. Accordingly, final regulations do not allow states to
operate unaffiliated standalone ES offices, and a full range of Wagner-
Peyser Act services must be made available during normal and custom-
ary business hours in at least one comprehensive one-stop center in
each local area.29
3) Responsibility for Wagner-Peyser Act funds. Amendments to
the Wagner-Peyser Act under WIA require the state ES agency to par-
ticipate in the one-stop delivery system and be a member of the state
and local boards. The amendments did not alter the Wagner-Peyser Act
requirement that vested authority to the state agency designated by the
governor to administer Wagner-Peyser Act funds and deliver services.
Federal interim regulations reinforced the requirement that state ES
agencies retain responsibility for Wagner-Peyser Act funds. During the
regulatory comment period, the New York ES agency expressed con-
cern about a state legislature’s authority to determine the distribution of
Wagner-Peyser Act funds. During the period between issuance of inter-
im and final regulations, this concern made a valuable contribution by
helping define USDOL policy in addressing issues raised by the Flori-
da legislature.
During 1999 and 2000, the state of Florida proposed two distinct
legislative initiatives (see previous discussion) that attempted to local-
ize the authority of the Florida ES agency and abolish merit staffing.
Both legislative proposals conflicted with requirements of the Wagner-
Peyser Act and regulations. The proposed Florida legislative actions
focused USDOL policy. USDOL took a firm stance that the Florida ES
agency controlled the distribution of Wagner-Peyser Act funds and ad-
ministration of services. 
Federal policy. Final federal regulations clarified that the state
agency, under the direction of the governor, is responsible for the distri-
bution and oversight of Wagner-Peyser Act funds. However, USDOL
stated in the preamble to the regulations that state legislatures have the
authority to set priorities for uses of Wagner-Peyser Act funds.
4) Relationship between UI and ES. In the 1990s, WPRS legisla-
tion, WIA, and policy stances taken by USDOL strengthened the al-
liance between UI and ES programs first cultivated by the founders of
the federal–state employment security system. Under an amendment to
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the Wagner-Peyser Act in WIA, state Wagner-Peyser Act agencies were
required to provide reemployment services to UI claimants. In crafting
regulations, USDOL anticipated that some state ES agencies might be
financially unable to provide reemployment services and included lan-
guage in the preamble to allow delivery of reemployment services by
other service providers. Also, compliance issues that arose in Michigan
regarding the delivery of staff-assisted services to UI claimants and the
administration of the UI work test prompted the strengthening of Wag-
ner-Peyser Act regulations in these areas. 
Federal policy. State ES agencies retain responsibility for the
delivery of reemployment services to UI claimants and administration
of the work test under state UI laws. In order to ensure that UI
claimants receive help to reenter the labor market, other one-stop part-
ners may provide services to them. Subsequently, USDOL policies to
promote the use of UI call centers and Internet claims filing may have
weakened the relationships between UI and ES, as well as other service
providers. 
5) Universal access to Wagner-Peyser Act services and methods
of service delivery. Since the inception of the Wagner-Peyser Act, a
condition of state agency delivery is that services be made available
statewide and universally to employers and job seekers eligible to work
in the United States. Under Title I of WIA, the requirement of universal
access to core (i.e., labor exchange) services was extended to programs
that fund services for adults and dislocated workers. During the regula-
tory process, several stakeholders questioned whether Wagner-Peyser
Act funds should provide most of the universal access to core services.
Through regulations, USDOL reinforced WIA language to ensure that
Wagner-Peyser Act funds would not be the sole support for core ser-
vices in one-stop centers. This strong federal stance was taken perhaps
in recognition of the historic paucity of state Wagner-Peyser Act funds,
and to affirm the promise of the one-stop solution.
Another federal issue that arose in the regulatory process was how
to integrate Wagner-Peyser Act services and WIA adult and dislocated
worker core services. Although WIA defines core and intensive ser-
vices, these services are neither defined nor referenced in the Wagner-
Peyser Act. In an effort to consolidate service delivery and increase the
availability of funds at one-stop centers, USDOL cross-referenced WIA
definitions of core and applicable intensive services in Wagner-Peyser
Act regulations.
While Title I of WIA defines two types of job finding services (i.e.,
core and intensive), the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations require services
to be available through three service delivery methods: 1) self-service,
2) facilitated self-help service, and 3) staff-assisted service. The three
service methods are closely aligned with WIA core and intensive ser-
vices. The genesis of the three Wagner-Peyser Act service methods
sprang from state Wagner-Peyser Act practices, technological advances
in job finding, recommendations of the ES Revitalization work group,
and compliance issues that arose in Michigan.
A key provision of the Michigan agreement surrounds the meaning
of staff-assisted services. During a meeting between USDOL and
Michigan officials on June 25, 1998, Michigan asserted that the re-
quirement of staff-assisted services was met by having “proctors” in
one-stop centers’ resource rooms to assist job seekers in the use of self-
service job finding software. In response, USDOL averred that Michi-
gan proctors were only providing “facilitated self-help” service and not
staff-assisted job finding and placement services. As a result, in the
Michigan agreement, USDOL required a Michigan service strategy that
included job search assistance and staff-assisted referrals to job open-
ings, in addition to a cadre of “proctors” providing facilitated self-help
services. Wagner-Peyser Act regulations were crafted to make a clear
distinction between facilitated self-help service and staff-assisted ser-
vice methods.
Federal policy. Regulations require state ES agencies to provide
three methods of service delivery (cited above) in at least one compre-
hensive one-stop center in each local area. Services must be available
statewide and their application should be described in state and local
WIA memoranda of understanding. Also, each one-stop partner in the
comprehensive one-stop center must make available the core services
of its program. It is USDOL’s contention that funding core and inten-
sive services under both WIA and the Wagner-Peyser Act enables state
and local boards to make choices that maximize the use of funds.
6) State plans. Prior to the Wagner-Peyser Act amendments of
1982, state UI and ES programs prepared joint, yearly planning docu-
ments to coordinate the delivery of services to job seekers, UI
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claimants, and employers. These plans, called the Program Budget
Plan, were submitted to USDOL to ensure compliance with federal re-
quirements and national policy priorities. Beginning in program year
1984, Wagner-Peyser Act requirements were revised to require state ES
plans to be developed jointly with JTPA programs. Over the years, an-
nual state ES plans30 became flat and pro forma.
Under WIA, states are required to submit five-year plans. During
the regulatory process, USDOL made two determinations that impacted
state Wagner-Peyser Act plans. The first decision was that Wagner-
Peyser Act plans must be functionally integrated within states’ strategic
WIA or unified plans. State governors are not permitted to submit their
statewide Wagner-Peyser Act plans as separate components of a joint
plan; instead they must be submitted as integrated documents. Second-
ly, integrated WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act plans are developed for five
years without annual updates, notwithstanding changes in the organiza-
tion of the states’ workforce structure or levels of performance. In our
view, these decisions have produced state WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act
plans that are compliance documents rather than strategic blueprints,
and states would be better served if five-year plans were required to be
updated annually.
Federal policy. To ensure a collaborative planning process be-
tween state boards and state ES agencies, federal regulations require
states to submit integrated plans encompassing Title I of WIA and Wag-
ner-Peyser Act programs. States may utilize either of two planning doc-
uments: 1) Strategic Five Year State Plan for Title I of WIA and the
Wagner-Peyser Act, or 2) State Unified Plan.
Regulatory Shifts in Workforce Federalism
During the initial two eras of New Federalism, USDOL abrogated
to states much policy and program control of Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vice delivery. Federal Wagner-Peyser Act regulations in 1983 devolved
authority of labor exchange policy to state control, and regulations
were intentionally silent on issues of national sovereignty (e.g., ser-
vices and merit standards). The federal–state ES program tilted toward
states in the spirit of New Federalism. Job training programs began to
dominate the workforce development scene, and funds shifted to local
job training agencies.
In 2000, USDOL failed to hardwire the vision of some New Dem-
ocrat and Republican policy makers at each level of government who
sought local control of Wagner-Peyser Act policy. Supporters of local
control argued that it is sensitive to labor markets, is innovative and
promotes stronger employer involvement. Backers of state control as-
serted that to ensure impartial and equitable service delivery statewide,
a state agency under the direction of the governor must administer
Wagner-Peyser Act policy.
The triumph of cooperative federalism over second order devolu-
tion thwarted attempts to push Wagner-Peyser Act authority through the
knothole31 of state government to local agencies. Revised Wagner-
Peyser Act regulations reversed 15 years of federal inaction in the over-
sight of labor exchange policy, and new regulatory provisions recog-
nized the exclusive authority of the state ES agency and prescribed
service and merit requirements that supported that authority. The re-
quirement of a merit personnel system ensures the solidarity of a single
state agency to administer labor exchange policy at the local level.
Without it, statewide labor exchange policy would likely be diffused
among local boards and lose its state composition. A single state Wag-
ner-Peyser Act agency provides state governors with the power to reach
down to their local communities to direct labor exchange policy. Work-
force federalism shifted labor exchange policy in four areas:
1) Rather than devolve state agencies’ authority over Wagner-Pey-
ser Act funds and services to the control of state and local WIA
boards, federal regulations strengthened the authority of state
ES agencies.
2) The Wagner-Peyser Act regulations of 1983 were silent on
many issues of state agency administration. Similarly, amend-
ments to the Wagner-Peyser Act in WIA did not include
changes to state authority, merit personnel protection, or coor-
dination with UI. However, challenges during the 1990s to US-
DOL’s authority to set conditions and enforce them on states
required the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations of 2000 to
strengthen the federal–state ES program in those areas.
3) Under Title I of WIA, the principle of universal access was ex-
panded beyond the Wagner-Peyser Act to include adult and dis-
located worker programs. In the Wagner-Peyser Act regula-
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tions of 2000, USDOL mandated that Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices include three distinct service delivery methods (i.e., self-
service, facilitated self-help, and staff-assisted services) to
meet the needs of a statewide labor exchange structure.
4) The state ES agency was not designated in WIA to administer
the one-stop delivery system, although it is required to be a
partner in the system and provide a full-range of Wagner-
Peyser Act services in at least one comprehensive one-stop
center in each local area.
LABOR EXCHANGE POLICY CHALLENGES 
An emerging federal issue in the reauthorization of WIA in 2003
indicates a new challenge for U.S. labor exchange policy. Some believe
that WIA failed to provide state governors with sufficient power to di-
rect state job training and economic development policies within states
because WIA funding formulas mandate that most job training funds go
to local areas. The ascendancy of governors in WIA may be an issue of
hefty political debate and thus could signal the twilight of second order
devolution and local control of workforce federalism.
On the other hand, the Bush Administration’s FY 2003 budget in-
cluded a far-reaching UI/ES reform proposal dubbed “New Balance.”
Introduced in September 2002, the New Balance bill (H.R. 5418) pro-
posed to add a new player to the federal–state–local relationships: the
state legislatures. Under the bill, the federal government would no
longer provide funds to administer services under the Wagner-Peyser
Act; instead, financing of ES and UI programs would be shifted to
states through a multiyear phase-out of 75 percent of the federal unem-
ployment tax paid by employers. The new player—the state legis-
latures—would have the potential to increase or reduce the funding 
of state ES programs by requiring governors to justify their funding
requirements. 
While the bill is a vestige of Reagan-era Devolution Federalism, it
is motivated by two decades of complaints by the states and employers
about inadequate funding of ES and UI administrative expenses. Con-
current to the underfunding of administrative expenses, employer UI
taxes have generated large balances in the UI Trust Fund. Further, some
employers have been effectively double taxed by states supplementing
ES and UI funds. In devolving the financing of ES and UI programs to
the states, the New Balance bill requires states to continue labor ex-
change services. However, it does not ensure that state legislatures
would authorize funds to maintain state labor exchange operations at
current levels. As of this writing, the New Balance bill was not reintro-
duced in the 108th Congress.
WIA Reauthorization
In its FY 2004 budget request, the Bush Administration continues
to press for fundamental changes in the administration of labor ex-
change policies. The authorization of WIA expires on September 30,
2003, and a provision in President Bush’s proposal32 to consolidate
Wagner-Peyser Act and WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker funding
streams is intended to integrate the majority of services at one-stop cen-
ters. To accomplish this, the Bush proposal would repeal the long-
standing Wagner-Peyser Act and incorporate some of its features into
WIA. The funding for core services of one-stop centers would be pro-
vided to states and local areas through one consolidated block grant.
Federal funds would be derived from general revenues appropriated by
Congress. If enacted, this provision would unravel the mutual funding
of UI and ES services through the UI trust fund. However, efforts in
Bush’s companion bill (H.R. 444, “Back to Work Incentive Act”) to
promote the use of Personal Reemployment Accounts to UI recipients
who need the most help in getting back to work may increase the use of
some labor exchange services, such as job placement.
Nonetheless, Bush’s proposal raises as a prime issue the distribution
of power between state governors and local leaders for control of labor
exchange policy. Currently, Wagner-Peyser Act funds are retained at
state levels under the purview of governors. Under the Bush proposal’s
consolidated funding approach, 50 percent of the combined adult fund-
ing stream must be sent to local areas according to statutory distribution.
Hence, in comparison to the Wagner-Peyser Act, state governors could
lose authority over the bulk of their labor exchange funds and, as a pos-
sible consequence, their ability to steer labor exchange policies state-
wide. This provision may be contested in the enactment process.
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While it is too early to predict the consequences of most provisions
in the Bush proposal, the provisions would clearly provide for greater
flexibility in the use of labor exchange funds by local areas. Converse-
ly, they would nullify the public charter of ES, allow private service
providers to deliver labor exchange services, and may hamper the coor-
dination of labor exchange and UI services.
SUMMARY
This chapter tracked federal–state relations in labor exchange poli-
cy throughout the life of the Wagner-Peyser Act. During the first 35
years of the act, efforts to shift the federal–state balance of power were
directed at “federalizing” the program; during the last 35 years, efforts
were directed at “localizing” it. Beginning in the 1970s and throughout
the three eras of New Federalism, weak federal stewardship of the Wag-
ner-Peyser Act was noticeable in reduced Wagner-Peyser Act grants-in-
aid, as well as in ambivalence and skepticism toward labor exchange
policy. At the same time, the role of local job training agencies was nur-
tured and training grants-in-aid were increased.
During these eras, there was a preference for local control of work-
force development programs. In 1978, Carter affirmed the primacy of
local control by embracing the Nixon federal–local job training
arrangement, and in 1996 Clinton reaffirmed it as a matter of public ap-
probation. Through the one-stop solution, Clinton devised a “third-
way” approach to workforce federalism that ultimately did not reappor-
tion political control of ES and job training programs. The role of
governors in administering labor exchange policy was strengthened,
and state ES agencies and local job training agencies were fastened to-
gether by local one-stop delivery systems. The effect of the third-way
approach on statewide labor exchange policy outcomes is as yet un-
known. As the new century beckons new approaches to labor exchange
policy, we make the following observations:
• Fragmented governance is the result of local workforce federal-
ism, and it appears to foster intrastate rivalries and fragmented
delivery of workforce services.
• Despite the federal–state character of ES programs, local work-
force federalism has sometimes precipitated uneven labor ex-
change services from one-stop center to one-stop center within
states and across states.
• Local control of workforce programs may have inhibited the
ability of state governors to connect economic development and
workforce development in local areas.
• At the end of the 20th century, federal–state conflicts in grants-
in-aid policy under the Wagner-Peyser Act established that states
do not have the right, absent federal approval, to subrogate to
subgovernments or private agencies funds for administration or
delivery of labor exchange services.
• Merit personnel requirements help ensure the continuity of a sin-
gle state Wagner-Peyser Act agency and the equitable delivery of
labor exchange services statewide.
The journey of the Bush presidency perhaps bids another turn of
federalism’s historic wheel as it applies to labor exchange policy. Pres-
ident Bush’s New Balance bill and WIA reauthorization proposal
would shift some workforce development control to state governors,
but would dismantle the New Deal era administrative structures of ES
and UI programs. As in the past, centralization, and decentralization33
will continue to pose splendid tensions in U.S. workforce federalism. 
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1. The Great Depression, according to Humphrey (1970, p. 47), necessitated expan-
sion of the federal role through preventive measures (e.g., national employment
system) as well as other corrective interventions. Humphrey explains the federal
government’s new purpose during the 1930s by excerpting from Roosevelt’s Oc-
tober 1936 address at Worcester, Massachusetts, a quote from Lincoln: “The le-
gitimate object of government is to do for the people what needs to be done but
which they cannot by individual effort do at all, or do so well, for themselves.”
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2. While federal grants-in-aid mushroomed in the 20th century, the first grants to
states were under the Articles of Confederation, when in 1785 Congress ear-
marked a section of every township in the federal territory for the support of pub-
lic schools (Vines 1976, p. 14).
3. In 2003, grants are allotted to states by USDOL under a formula at section 6 of
the Wagner-Peyser Act that distributes 97 percent of the annual ES appropriation
according to each state’s relative share of the civilian labor force and number of
unemployed workers. USDOL distributes 3 percent of the total available ES funds
to states to assure maintenance of statewide ES systems. Ninety-seven percent of
state ES grants is derived from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, an employer-
based tax, and 3 percent is derived from general tax receipts.
4. The adoption of a federal–state structure for the ES program in 1933 may have
helped sway politicians to select an identical arrangement in 1935 for the UI pro-
gram (Blaustein 1993, p.137). 
5. In 1966 the U.S. Senate passed a bill (S.2974) to reform the Wagner-Peyser Act
and make ES agencies the centerpiece of a comprehensive manpower system. The
House did not take up the bill because the bill mandated the separation of ES from
UI and increased the authority of the federal government in state ES activities
(Guttman 1990).
6. Barnow (1993, p. 94) and King (1999, p. 63) refer to workforce development af-
ter 1978 as “coercive federalism,” where the federal government offers states
greater authority but adds significant constraints. Labor exchange policy was es-
tablished during the period of cooperative federalism, and the basic requirements
of the Wagner-Peyser Act remain unchanged. Therefore, as labor exchange policy
applies to federalism, we do not refer to it as coercive.
7. Introduced in February 1987 by Representative Michael (H.R. 1155) and Senator
Dole (S.539), the bill at Title I, Subtitles F and G contained the Employment Se-
curity Financing Act of 1987 and the Employment Services Act of 1987, expand-
ing the role of governors and the private sector in ES activities. While the legisla-
tion garnered only 30 House cosponsors and 2 Senate cosponsors, it did spotlight
a political trend toward decentralized governance. 
8. This section draws from Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz (1997) and Balducchi and
Pasternak (2001). 
9. If enacted, the amendment may have raised serious accountability, equity, and
continuity of service issues in the statewide delivery of impartial labor exchange
services. However, the amendment did express the views of some policymakers at
each level of government who wanted USDOL to liberalize restrictions on the
uses of Wagner-Peyser Act funds.
10. Except in the cases of Colorado, Massachusetts, and Michigan, where demonstra-
tions of alternative delivery systems are under way.
11. The work group’s vision statement declared, “The ES is the Nation’s recog-
nized leader in providing labor exchange services and a universal gateway to
workforce development resources by professional, empowered employees”
(USDOL 1994).
12. In over two-thirds of states, ES was the major provider of reemployment services,
serving more than 75 percent of UI claimants (USDOL 1999, p. II-14).
13. Politicians viewed Temporary Assistance for Needy Families as a state program
and welfare-to-work as a local program. Mayors and county officials argued that
hard-to-serve welfare recipients reside in urban areas, and USDOL grants should
be under their control (Uhalde 2002). 
14. In October 1997, the Employment and Training Administration issued policy
guidance to state ES agencies to spur growth of reemployment services to UI
claimants (USDOL 1997).
15. A matching requirement was placed in the original act in some measure to take
advantage of state funds in 23 states that already operated ES offices. The re-
quirement was in effect until federalization of the ES in 1941 and not resumed
when Congress returned the ES to federal–state administration in 1946 (Haber
and Kruger 1964, pp. 27 and 35). In 1950, the Wagner-Peyser Act was amended to
eliminate the matching provision.
16. The original language of the Wagner-Peyser Act required states to appoint adviso-
ry councils composed of employers, workers, and the public to formulate labor
exchange policies. In 1939, through presidential order, USES and the Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation were merged in the Social Security Board to form
the Bureau of Employment Security, and the scope of federal and state advisory
councils was broadened to include the formulation of UI policies.
17. USDOL did have an initial policy position on competition in one-stop center op-
erations, and the Massachusetts model reflected the views of high-level White
House and USDOL officials. USDOL’s policy changed over time, and formal
ETA policy was established in the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations of 2000. 
18. Early results of the Massachusetts demonstration are varied. Drake Beam Morin,
a for-profit placement firm, dropped its contract to deliver services at the JobNet
Boston one-stop center when it could not select job seekers to serve and meet
profit expectations (Westat, Inc. 2001).
19. This section is drawn from Balducchi and Pasternak (2001).
20. Palmer (2002) asserts that the basis for Michigan’s reorganization was inade-
quate federal ES funding, the prospect of cost savings through competitive
selection of service providers, and expansion of service access points and tech-
nology.
21. According to Palmer (2002), Michigan proposed to exercise the flexibility it be-
lieved it had under existing federal law and policy to “utilize a combination of
state government, local government, and private entity-provided services to carry
out the Wagner-Peyser Act and meet employer and job seeker needs in accordance
with state needs and priorities.”
22. In 1935, USDOL suspended Missouri’s Wagner-Peyser Act grant for violation of
merit staffing under section 3(a) of the Wagner-Peyser Act. A USDOL letter dated
August 24, 1935, to Missouri (apparently based upon a USDOL solicitor’s opin-
ion of March 7, 1935, sent to Iowa) was included in USDOL’s court brief. Al-
though USDOL also argued that Michigan had violated section 5(b) of the Wag-
62 Balducchi and Pasternak
Federal–State Relations in Labor Exchange Policy 63
ner-Peyser Act, the court ruling was based solely on section 3(a) as cited in the
Missouri precedent. As far as we know, the Michigan compliance dispute marked
only the second instance of sanctions under the Wagner-Peyser Act imposed upon
a state.
23. Congress advised USDOL to work out an agreement with Michigan. Both Michi-
gan and organized labor could have blocked Senate passage of the workforce de-
velopment bill (Uhalde 2002).
24. Engler and Herman met on July 23, 1998. Engler did not come to the meeting
with a compromise proposal; he recalls that the agreement was developed at the
meeting. Herman and Engler met alone in a small library adjacent to the Secre-
tary’s office (Engler 2002; Uhalde 2002).
25. USDOL did not raise a legal objection to Missouri’s 1999 reorganization that sep-
arated UI and ES agencies but did not privatize ES activities. The authors believe
in the importance of close linkages between UI and ES activities, and that such
linkages are generally achieved under the aegis of a single agency. In a letter to
Florida, USDOL (2000) stated, “ . . . (A)s a policy matter, the State should appre-
ciate the centrality to the One-Stop delivery system of the administrative relation-
ship between Wagner-Peyser Act services and UI services.”
26. USDOL permitted Massachusetts and Colorado to use alternative service delivery
approaches under the authority of their one-stop implementation grants, which
were distributed to states under Wagner-Peyser Act authorization. Prior to its one-
stop implementation grant, Colorado utilized limited county-based delivery of
services consistent with its Wagner-Peyser Act plan of service. Michigan received
permission to use alternative service delivery approaches through its Wagner-
Peyser Act plan of service. The statutory authority that allows for alternative de-
livery approaches is section 3(a) of the Wagner-Peyser Act.
27. Administrative regulations at 20 CFR 652 are rules that implement Wagner-
Peyser Act provisions and establish federal requirements for receipt of Wagner-
Peyser Act funds. Policy directives are ETA program guidelines issued to state ES
agencies.
28. Public employee unions raised a residual concern over the degree of supervision
that private or other public one-stop operators could exercise over state Wagner-
Peyser Act employees. The Service Employees International Union (1998) stated,
“private supervision of the employment service creates an opportunity for the di-
version of public resources to further private interests.” Early in the process, fed-
eral policymakers determined that private or other public agency one-stop opera-
tors must dispense only guidance to state Wagner-Peyser Act employees in
administering labor exchange services. The term guidance was not defined in fed-
eral regulations or subsequent policy directives. 
29. One result of these decisions has been that in some local areas of a number of
states, one-stop centers and ES offices are located near each other, which might be
redundant. It would be interesting to know why in some instances customers pre-
fer to go to ES offices rather than nearby one-stop centers selected by local
boards, and in other instances the opposite.
30. USDOL’s appropriation laws for FYs 1996–98 contained language, incorporated
in WIA, which enabled states to seek waivers of ES plan requirements at section
8 of the Wagner-Peyser Act. Requests for waivers of the plan requirements at sec-
tion 8 and of the audit and reporting requirements at sections 9 and 10 were scant-
ily requested, as they were ministerial in nature or rendered moot by virtue of oth-
er federal requirements that prohibited granting of such waivers.
31. We refer to this as Knothole Federalism. A knothole is used as a metaphor to il-
lustrate this trend in federalism. In the case of WIA, state entities responsible for
job training programs act as wooden planks through which the federal govern-
ment punctures a knothole in state authority to pass federal policy and funds to lo-
cal boards and operating entities.
32. On March 13, 2003, Representatives McKeon (R-CA) and Boehner (R-OH) in-
troduced H.R. 1261, “Workforce Reinvestment and Adult Education Act.” H.R.
1261 was not the Bush Administration’s bill, but its provisions were substantially
similar to the Bush proposal.
33. Interestingly, Block (1993, p. 103) suggests that “. . . decentralization often has
the opposite effect of its intention” as each new self-ruling division begins recre-
ating within itself the ethos of the larger organization that was taken apart.
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Appendix 2A
Reorganization of the Michigan Jobs Commission:
Chronology & Anatomy of a Wagner-Peyser Act 
Compliance Dispute
DATE ACTIONS
8/6/97 John Engler, Governor of Michigan, issues Executive Order
1997-12, which sets in motion reorganization of the Michigan
Jobs Commission (MJC).
8/18/97 Letter from Melvin Howard, Acting ETA Regional Administrator,
to Douglas Stites, MJC Chief Operating Officer, raises questions
relating to federal requirements. 
9/12/97 Letter from USDOL to Douglas Rothwell, MJC Chief Executive
Officer, advising MJC to suspend implementation and submit
Wagner-Peyser Act plan and one-stop grant modification.
9/30/97 MJC shares draft Wagner-Peyser Act plan modification with
USDOL at Washington, DC, meeting. USDOL indicates that
merit-staffing requirements apply to Wagner-Peyser Act services.
10/6/97 Letter from USDOL to Rothwell regarding effects of
reorganization on UI program. USDOL sets forth Wagner-Peyser
Act requirements that include UI work test and reemployment
services provisions.
10/21/97 Letter from USDOL to Stites commenting on draft Wagner-
Peyser Act plan modification and requesting submission of One-
stop plan modification. USDOL describes areas of deficiencies
with MJC reorganization.
10/31/97 Letter from Stites to Raymond Uhalde, Acting ETA Assistant
Secretary, responding to October 6 letter and informing USDOL
that UI claimants will register for work via America’s Talent
Bank.
11/17/97 Engler issues Executive Order 1997-18, which completes the
MJC reorganization.
12/8/97 USDOL receives formal copy of Michigan’s Wagner-Peyser Act
modification, which is identical to draft modification. Letter from
Stites to Uhalde addresses Wagner-Peyser Act issues raised in
October 21 letter.
12/24/97 Letter from USDOL to Rothwell advising that the Wagner-Peyser
Act plan modification will not be approved, describing
deficiencies in the plan modification, and requesting its
withdrawal.
12/30/97 MJC withdraws its request for a Wagner-Peyser Act plan
modification. During this period, Alexis Herman, USDOL
Secretary, contacts Engler by telephone to discuss the MJC
reorganization. 
1/21/98 MJC officials attend meeting at USDOL to discuss major issues,
including merit staffing and over-reliance on computer self-
services. USDOL offers potential opportunity for sub-state pilots
of alternate delivery systems. MJC officials indicate that they will
apprise Engler and get back to USDOL. 
1/30/98 Herman contacts Engler by telephone to notify him that issues
remain unresolved.
1/30/98 Two letters from USDOL to MJC: 1) Uhalde to Rothwell stating
that unless ETA receives notification from MJC that
reorganization will be suspended on February 2, Wagner-Peyser
Act and one-stop grants will be adversely affected; 2) Howard to
Stites stating that Wagner-Peyser Act plan modification must be
approved prior to implementation of reorganization. USDOL
prepares to freeze MJC’s drawdown authority, provide
reimbursement for only approved Wagner-Peyser Act activities,
and terminate Michigan’s one-stop grant.
1/30/98 Letter from Stites to Uhalde resubmitting Wagner-Peyser Act
plan modification without changes required by USDOL. 
2/2/98 Stites informs Howard by telephone that MJC is going to execute
the reorganization plan. MJC files motion for temporary
restraining order and order to show cause in U.S. District Court.
2/3/98 Two letters from USDOL to MJC: 1) Howard to Stites to
withhold drawdown authority until modification to Wagner-
Peyser Act plan; 2) Janice Perry, ETA Grant Officer, to Stites
notifying MJC that (a) second year One-stop grant funds denied,
and (b) first year funds not available after February 2, 1998.
2/6/98 Preliminary hearing held in U.S. District Court in Grand Rapids,
MI, before Judge Robert Holmes Bell.
2/10/98 Bell denies MJC’s request for injunction against USDOL actions.
Sets April 15 to hear merit-staffing issue. (Hearing subsequently
postponed until May 1, 1998.)
2/27/98 Letter from Howard to Stites denying approval of January 30
Wagner-Peyser Act plan modification.
3/13/98 USDOL and MJC file briefs on merit staffing in U.S District
Court.
3/25/98 Uhalde testifies before Rep. Hoekstra’s (R-MI) Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation.
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3/26/98 Letter from Stites to Uhalde addressing issues raised in February
27 disapproval letter.
4/1/98 ETA officials meet with Stites and John Palmer, MJC ES
Director, in Washington, DC, to clarify issues and seek resolution
of concerns outside of the merit-staffing issue.
5/1/98 Bell holds a hearing on the merit-staffing issue.
5/15/98 Bell issues an opinion and an order granting USDOL’s motion for
summary judgment. The court upholds USDOL’s position on
merit staffing, indicating that it “is neither arbitrary or capricious
nor in excess of the Department’s authority.”
6/12/98 Letter from Byron Zuidema, ETA Regional Administrator, to
Stites denying Michigan’s PY 1998 Wagner-Peyser Act plan.
Issues unresolved: 1) merit staffing; 2) stakeholder input; 3) UI
work test; 4) universal access to computer self-services; 5)
program data reports; 6) staff-assisted job search assistance; and
7) VETS concerns. 
6/23/98 Letter from Palmer to Zuidema requesting reimbursement of $2.9
million for February 1998.
6/25/98 Stites and Palmer meet with Uhalde, John Beverly, USES
Director, and David Balducchi, USES Chief of Planning and
Review, in daylong dialogue to bring Michigan’s Wagner-Peyser
Act plan into compliance. 
7/23/98 Herman and Engler meet at USDOL to discuss the MJC issue.
7/31/98 Herman and Engler announce a resolution to the dispute and a
framework for the administration of Michigan’s ES program.
MJC agrees to drop judicial, legislative and policy actions.
8/12/98 Letter from Stites to Zuidema submitting revised Wagner-Peyser
Act plan. 
8/20/98 Uhalde meets with Stites and stakeholders in Lansing, MI, to
discuss implementation issues and obtain stakeholder input.
9/2/98 Letter from Zuidema to Stites raising issues with revised Wagner-
Peyser Act plan.
9/10/98 Letter from Stites to Zuidema addressing September 2 letter.
USDOL not satisfied with response.
9/13/98 Kitty Higgins, USDOL Deputy Secretary, meets with labor union
leaders from AFL-CIO, AFSCME, and SEIU regarding
implementation of the Michigan agreement. 
9/16/98 Letter from Zuidema to Stites requesting additional time (no later
than September 30, 1998) to resolve four outstanding issues: 1)
presence of at least one state merit-staffed employee in each
workforce area to perform UI work test; 2) accelerating
commencement of staff-assisted services; 3) content and
submission of transition plan; and 4) performance benchmarks.
Letter declares that MJC may treat this as a denial of plan
submitted August 12. Letter authorizes reimbursement of $2.9
million for February 1998 Wagner-Peyser Act costs.
9/18/98 Letter from Stites to Zuidema addressing the four issues raised in
September 16 letter. USDOL not satisfied with response.
9/21/98 Conference call between Beverly, Balducchi, Stites and Palmer to
clarify the four issues raised in the September 16 letter. Achieve
potential resolution of issues regarding staff-assisted services,
transition plan, and performance benchmarks; however, no
resolution of UI work test issues.
9/25/98 Higgins meets again with union leaders (same participants as
September 13 meeting). Unions express dissatisfaction with
September 16 letter from USDOL to MJC (releasing funds) and
indicate that former state ES employees are not receiving an
opportunity to fairly compete for jobs. 
9/25/98 Herman calls Engler to relate that agreement has broken down
and MJC needs to be flexible. 
9/29/98 Uhalde and Beverly travel to Lansing, MI, to discuss terms of
agreement with MJC and union leaders.
10/13/98 Letter from Stites to Zuidema providing sufficient information to
resolve remaining four issues.
10/14/98 Letter from Barry Dale, ETA Regional Grant Officer, to Stites
indicating that October 13 letter fully resolves issues and
Michigan’s PY 1998 plan is approved. Letter removes
reimbursement provision on remaining PY 1996–97 Wagner-
Peyser Act expenditures and enables MJC to again draw down
Wagner-Peyser Act funds.
10/30/98 USDOL restarts Michigan’s one-stop grant for second and third
years.
11/3/98 MJC effectuates one-stop agreement.
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